Liberia

Liberia has participated once with a voluntary contribution of $11,821 to UNFICYP (UNDPI 1996, 708). The main reason why Liberia has not sent troops is because it has been affected by two struggles that caused a weak political structure. As a result, “Liberia has been in need of peace operations. Liberia is Africa's oldest republic, but it became better known in the 1990s for its long-running, ruinous civil war and its role in a rebellion in neighbouring Sierra Leone” (BCC 2006ad, par. 1).

Liberia currently has a second UN mission. The first mission was the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), present September 1993 to September 1997 (UN 2001b, par. 1).
It was established to exercise good offices in support of the efforts of the Economic Community of West African States [ECOWAS] and the Liberian National Transitional Government to implement peace agreements; investigate alleged ceasefire violations; assist in maintenance of assembly sites and demobilization of combatants; support humanitarian assistance; investigate human rights violations and assist local human rights groups; observe and verify elections. (Ibid.)

The second and current mission is the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), established by Security Council resolution 1509 (2003) of September 2003 to support the implementation of the ceasefire agreement and the peace process (UN 2005e, par. 1).

Initial variables of the data collection process:

UN/UN peacekeeping policy reform
No record.

Perception of peacekeeping
No record.

Domestic political environment
The political history of Liberia has been dominated by two struggles (EIU 2006z, 12). The first, between the Americo-Liberians and the majority indigenous population, was ostensibly resolved by the 1980 coup (Ibid.). The second has been between various indigenous ethnic groups and has been based as much on a desire to avenge past grievances as on the ambition to secure political and economic power (Ibid.).

At the end of the 1980s the perceived dominance and ruthlessness of Samuel Doe’s Krahn group enabled Taylor and his NPFL [National Patriotic Front of Liberia] to win support from many other ethnic groups against the incumbent regime. However, the civil war between 1999 and 2003 complicated the political set-up, with many old loyalties being diluted by the desire of many Liberians to make a break with the past. This led to the arrival of a plethora of newcomers with no apparent power base on the political scene for the 2005 elections. (Ibid., 12)

Domestic economic environment
Liberia has a history of weak economic policy formulation and implementation (Ibid., 21). The years of civil war from 1990 to 1997 and again between 2000 and 2003 made effective economic policy impossible, with successive governments focusing mainly on financing wars and maintaining their grip on power (Ibid.). Economic policy will continue to focus on reconstruction, with spending guided by the donor-directed Governance and Economic Management Action Plan (EIU 2006bw, 1).

Military affairs
Following the 2003 peace agreement, the UN Security Council created UNMIL, which was deployed in October 2003 and reached full strength in June 2004 with just over 15,000 troops (EIU 2006z, 15). UNMIL’s deployment effectively stopped the war and gradually brought all of Liberia’s 15 counties under control (Ibid.).

The operation became the biggest of its kind, following the scaling-down of the UN peacekeeping force in neighboring Sierra Leone, and has also been very costly, estimated at some US$750m of funding per year. There has therefore been much uncertainty over how long its mandate can be extended, despite the widespread demand from the population for UNMIL to remain. UNMIL’s mandate, which was originally scheduled to end in September 2004, was extended to September 2005, and again to March 2006. (Ibid.)

Meanwhile, donors have begun to address the issue of rebuilding Liberia’s security forces (Ibid., 16).

The US has been allocated the responsibility of running the Security Sector Reform (SSR) program, for which it has pledged US$200m. The three-year program initially aimed to recreate the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) as a small professional force of 4,000, with ground, air and maritime components, but funding shortfalls led to plans being scaled back in mid-2005 for a force of just 2,000. The US$35m program for the army is being implemented by a private security company, Dyncorps, which has already worked with the US on such programs in Iraq and Afghanistan and is expected to start work before the end of 2005. The restructuring of the police force is already well under way, with local recruits currently undergoing extensive training by UNMIL and an emergency police response service in place; the police force is targeted to reach its capacity of 6,000 by 2006. (Ibid.)

Foreign policy
Liberia’s relations with its fellow Mano River Union countries, Sierra Leone and Guinea, have been improving rapidly in recent years, following years of difficulties caused by the close interrelation between the security situations in all three countries (Ibid., 15).

Additional variables found after the preliminary analysis:

Climate changes
No record.

Independent negotiations taken by DPKO to seek troops
No record.

Independent negotiations taken by contributor countries to engage non-contributor countries
No record.

Meetings organized by other international organizations to engage in dialogue about peacekeeping
No record.